Vulnerability of Currency Pegs: Evidence from Brazil

This paper analyses predictions of a simple model of currency crises in which the peg will be abandoned when the currency overvaluation hits a certain threshold, unknown to the agents. Due to learning about the threshold, some features usually observed in the data and identified with models with multiple equilibria arise in the model. But the model yields distinctive predictions about the behaviour of the probability and the expected magnitude of a currency devaluation. The paper identifies the probability and expected magnitude of a devaluation of Brazilian Real in the period leading up to the end of the Brazilian pegged exchange rate regime, using data on exchange rate options. The empirical results are consistent with model predictions.Currency crises, exchange rate, options, probability of devaluation, devaluation size

There Will Be Money

A common belief among monetary theorists is that monetary equilibria are tenuous due to the intrinsic uselessness of fiat money (Wallace (1978)). In this article we argue that the tenuousness of monetary equilibria vanishes as soon as one introduces a small perturbation in an otherwise standard random matching model of money. Precisely, we show that the sheer belief that fiat money may become intrinsically useful, even if only in an almost unreachable state, might be enough to rule out nonmonetary equilibria. In a large region of parameters, agents' beliefs and behavior are completely determined by fundamentals.Fiat money, autarky, equilibrium selection

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises

We analyze the effect of risk aversion, wealth and portfolios on the behavior of investors in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices. The model generates a rich set of striking theoretical predictions. For example, risk aversion makes currency crises significantly less likely; increased wealth makes crises more likely; and foreign direct investment (illiquid investments in the target currency) make crises more likely. Our results extend linearly to a heterogeneous agent population.Currency crisis, Sunspots, Global games, Risk aversion, Wealth, Portfolio

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises

Market participants' risk attitudes, wealth and portfolio composition influence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and, therefore, may have important effects on the sustainability of currency pegs. We analyze such effects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices. The model, solved in closed form, generates a rich set of theoretical predictions consistent with many popular and academic (unmodelled) speculations about the onset and timing of currency crises. The results extend linearly to a heterogeneous agent population.Currency crisis, Global games, Risk aversion, Wealth, Portfolio

A Model of Equilibrium Institutions

Institutions that serve the interests of an elite are often cited as an important reason for poor economic performance. This paper builds a model of institutions that allocate resources and power to maximize the payoff of an elite, but where any group that exerts sufficient fighting effort can launch a rebellion that destroys the existing institutions. The rebels are then able to establish new institutions as a new elite, which will similarly face threats of rebellion. The paper analyses the economic consequences of the institutions that emerge as the equilibrium of this struggle for power. High levels of economic activity depend on protecting private property from expropriation, but the model predicts this can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as the elite would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables the elite to act as a government committed to property rights, which would otherwise be time inconsistent. But sharing power entails sharing rents, so in equilibrium power is too concentrated, leading to inefficiently low investment.institutions, political economy, power struggle, property rights, time inconsistency

Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies

This paper proposes a simple macroeconomic model with staggered investment decisions. The model captures the dynamic coordination problem arising from demand externalities and fixed costs of investment. In times of low economic activity, a firm faces low demand and hence has less incentives for investing, which reinforces firms’ expectations of low demand. In the unique equilibrium of the model, demand expectations are pinned down by fundamentals and history. Owing to the beliefs that arise in equilibrium, there is no special reason for stimulus at times of low economic activity

International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance

It is often argued that the provision of liquidity by the international institutions such as the IMF to countries experiencing balance of payment problems can have catalytic effects on the behavior of international financial markets, i.e., it can reduce the scale of liquidity runs by inducing investors to roll over their financial claims to the country. Critics point out that official lending also causes moral hazard distortions: expecting to be bailed out by the IMF, debtor countries have weak incentives to implement good but costly policies, thus raising the probability of a crisis. This paper presents an analytical framework to study the trade-off between official liquidity provision and debtor moral hazard. In our model international financial crises are caused by the interaction of bad fundamentals, self-fulfilling runs and policies by three classes of optimizing agents: international investors, the local government and the IMF. We show how an international financial institution helps prevent liquidity runs via coordination of agents' expectations, by raising the number of investors willing to lend to the country for any given level of the fundamental. We show that the influence of such an institution is increasing in the size of its interventions and the precision of its information: more liquidity support and better information make agents more willing to roll over their debt and reduces the probability of a crisis. Different from the conventional view stressing debtor moral hazard, we show that official lending may actually strengthen a government incentive to implement desirable but costly policies. By worsening the expected return on these policies, destructive liquidity runs may well discourage governments from undertaking them, unless they can count on contingent liquidity assistance.

International financial crises.

This is a compilation of my lecture notes for different courses. The choice of topics and the way I present them is influenced by my own personal opinions. It probably contains a few mistakes. It is not sufficient to understand the papers it covers. Nevertheless, it is useful for my teaching. If you have any comments, suggestions or if you spot any mistakes (or typos), please let me know. If you find it useful for teaching or studying, I will be very glad if you use it and send me an email to let me know.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default: a quantitative assessment

The recent European debt crisis has sparked a heated debate on the merits of fiscal austerity. Since the main objective of the proposed fiscal tightenings is to reduce sovereign default risk, the solution to this debate depends on the costs of a sovereign debt restructuring. One important cost is its negative effect on the banking system. This paper extends an off-the-shelf macroeconomic model with financial frictions in order to quantitatively assess the costs of financial disruption ensuing from a sovereign debt restructuring. Results show that the losses from financial disruption are offset by the benefits of a less contractionary fiscal policy. Government size is crucial for the relative effects of financial disruption as austerity becomes substantially more costly when tax rates are large. Keywords: Financial disruption; sovereign debt; sovereign default; Deleveraging

State-controlled companies and political risk: evidence from the 2014 Brazilian election

This paper examines the vulnerability of state-controlled companies to political risk using the 2014 Brazilian election and data on stock options. In her first term as Brazilian president, Ms. Dilma Rousseff took measures that were not aligned with the objective of maximizing profits of Petrobras, the Brazilian state-controlled oil company. She was reelected president in 2014. Results show that Petrobras would be worth around 62% (USD 45 billion) more if the opposition candidate had won the election. Using our estimated reelection probabilities and stock price data, we also find that the election of Ms. Rousseff had a negative impact on the value of several companies, but the effects on Petrobras and Banco do Brasil, the state-controlled bank, were particularly strong